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Don't
Play This Great Game
by
Stanley A. Weiss
LONDON
- To listen to Western commentators, Washington, Moscow and Beijing are
in the early rounds of a new Great Game, akin to the 19th-century struggle
between Czarist Russia and the British Empire for primacy in Central Asia.
Unable to resist the analogy, analysts sound more like sports announcers,
calling every play as a gain or loss for the players on the field.
This month's re-election of Kazakhstan's strongman president, Nursultan
Nazarbayev, in a vote that was neither free nor fair, will surely be cited
as the latest example of Soviet-style authoritarianism resisting the onslaught
of Western-style democracy.
The July summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization - made up of
China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan - was
billed as a "NATO of the East," a new team to counter American
global dominance. The SCO's call for a timetable for withdrawal of U.S.
forces from bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan was seen as the opening
play. Uzbekistan's subsequent decision to evict American forces and to
forge a new defense pact with Russia last month was called a strategic
loss for Washington and a win for Moscow.
Likewise, China's recent purchase of the second-largest oil company in
Kazakhstan and a new oil pipeline and railroad between the two countries
have been portrayed as proof of Beijing's unmatched economic prowess in
the region.
While colorful, such commentary fails to capture the real situation on
the ground. First, the grand prize itself - political, economic and military
influence over these oil-rich republics - may not be the trophy some imagine.
Though the Bush administration seeks to turn the region into a "corridor
of reform," with Kazakhstan as a "regional leader" (in
free markets, if not free elections), Central Asia largely remains a corridor
or criminality, oppression and corruption.
In fact, Uzbekistan's eviction of the Americans and its new bear hug with
Russia may turn out to be a blessing for Washington and a curse for Moscow.
After Tashkent's brutal suppression of protests last spring, Washington
is now in bed with one less despotic regime that oppresses its Muslim
population.
Second, despite old ethnic ties to Russia and new economic links with
China, the region increasingly looks West. Kazakhstan, among the world's
largest remaining oil and natural gas reserves, plans to tap into the
new Caspian pipeline from Azerbaijan to Turkey, thereby reducing its dependence
on oil export routes through Russia. Meanwhile, the United States has
become Kazakhstan's largest foreign investor.
Third, Russia, with its declining population, exodus of capital and demoralized
military, is too weak and China, with its voracious appetite for energy
and exploding population, is too feared to dominate the region.
Rumors about a new Russian-Chinese alliance are also greatly exaggerated.
Russian and Chinese troops did indeed this summer conduct their first
military exercise ever. But historic mistrust and potentially explosive
border disputes between the two powers suggest that closer ties are more
a tactical, temporary partnership rather than a long-term strategic alliance.
Indeed, the SCO will more likely be a way for Moscow and Beijing to keep
a check on each other in Central Asia rather than for keeping the Americans
out.
Finally, economic and political jockeying is unlikely to escalate into
military conflict. As General Charles Wald, deputy commander of U.S. forces
in Europe, tells me, "Although progress is often interrupted by political
con-cerns, our military-to-military relations with the Russians improve
every year."
Rather than be lured into a zero-sum Great Game of inevitable confrontation,
Washington, Moscow and Beijing should recognize Central Asia as an opportunity
for cooperation against the one danger that threatens all three - Islamic
terrorism.
The existential threat to Russia no longer emanates from NATO to the west,
but from Islamic militants to the south, from Chechnya and across its
southern republics. China is facing increasingly vocal demands from the
Uighur, Kazakh and Tajik Muslims in its western province of Xinjiang,
which separatists call "East Turkestan."
The United States, Russia and China could also counter the appeal of Islamic
extremism by working to reduce the region's economic misery. Recent progress
in negotiations to expand the Caspian Pipeline Consortium from Kazakhstan
to the Black Sea via Russia proves that cooperation is possible in the
name of economic development.
Washington's goal of promoting regional cooperation would benefit from
the involvement of two other powers: Rather than its self-defeating policy
of trying to isolate Iran, the United States should recognize it as a
potential partner in stabilizing and developing the region, as Tehran
has done in Afghanistan. And rather than a futile attempt to diminish
the SCO, Washington should encourage Indian membership so that New Delhi
can offer a democratic voice for reform and stability.
Dropping the alarmist rhetoric about Great Games and recognizing the reality
of the world's common interests in this vital region would be a strategy
worth trying. It also might be the one game where everyone wins.
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