Choosing a Template for Iraq
Unite or Perish
by Stanley A. Weiss

GSTAAD, Switzerland - "My apologies to Attila," George Clemenceau once remarked, "but the art of arranging how men are to live is more complex than the art of massacring them."

Free from the iron fist of Saddam Hussein, Iraqis now face the age-old question that has confronted multi-ethnic societies for centuries: how to arrange a nation from competing religious and ethnic groups that have often found it easier to massacre one another? A constitutional committee of Iraqis selected by the U.S.-appointed Governing Council is now in the early stages of trying to find an answer.

From Quebec to the Balkans to Indonesia, there is no shortage of models to guide Iraqis in what - and what not - to do. How they choose from among the menu of options will likely decide whether they succeed as a modern, pluralistic democracy (think Switzerland) or sink into an orgy of ethno-religious bloodletting (think Bosnia).

Iraq's long oppressed Shiites, who make up 60 percent of the population, will be the dominant player in any representative government. But political stability will also hinge on whether the nation's numerous ethnic minorities, religious sects and tribal groups feel secure.

So far, the 25-member Governing Council and cabinet posts are apportioned among 13 Shiite Arabs, five Sunni Arabs, five Sunni Kurds, one Turkmen and one Christian. Unable to agree on a single chief executive, the council has settled for an interim presidency that rotates monthly among nine of the most powerful members.

Here in Switzerland, often suggested as a possible model for Iraq, the presidency rotates among a federal council based on a "magic formula" that shares power among leading political parties. But Iraqis' should be wary. Around the world, sharing executive power along ethnic or religious lines hasn't worked.

In Cyprus, designating a Greek Cypriot president and reserving the vice presidency and seats in parliament for Turkish Cypriots failed to prevent the division of the island along ethnic lines. Lebanon's "national pact" reserved the presidency and a parliamentary majority for Maronite Christians, the prime minister for a Shiite, and the assembly speaker for a Sunni. But when Muslims became a majority, it took a 16-year civil war for the minority Christians to acquiesce to a more equitable balance of power.

More recently, Northern Ireland's celebrated power-sharing assembly of Protestants and Catholics has been suspended and new elections delayed due to continued Irish Republican Army intransigence. In Bosnia, the ineffectual federal presidency rotates among a Muslim, Croat and Serb, while Bosnians live in ethnically homogenous enclaves, countries-within-a-country, separated only by NATO-led foreign troops.

Failing to ensure the political, economic or cultural rights of a geographically-based minority is the quickest way for a central government to lose hearts and minds, and ultimately control of their country. Recall Serbia's loss of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia and most likely, Kosovo and Montenegro. Remember Ethiopia's loss of Eritrea, and Indonesia's loss of East Timor. Failure to address historic grievances contributed to the ethnic slaughter of Tutsis by Hutus in Rwanda. Russia has retained Chechnya, but only by destroying it.

So how to strike the right balance between a government strong enough to ensure stability yet limited enough to ensure the liberties of ethnic and religious minorities?

Iraqis should look to models that do work. In Quebec, Wales, Scotland and Spain's Basque country, ethnically-based separatist movements have been dampened by increased autonomy over political, economic and cultural matters. In Switzerland, real power lies with cantons and communes where ethnic Germans, French, and Italians largely govern themselves. (An old joke: "Do you know who the president of Switzerland is? Neither do the Swiss.") Multiple layers of government allow Belgium's Dutch-speaking Flemings in the north and French-speaking Walloons in the south to control local affairs.

Germany's 16 laender (states) have their own constitutions and legislatures that govern over all matters that are not the exclusive right of the federal government, such as defense, foreign affairs and finance. The spokesman for Ahmed Chalabi, the leader of the Iraqi National Congress opposition group and this month's Governing Council president, tells me, "We believe federalism is the only solution in Iraq, and we see the German constitution as a model. The important point is that it must be administrative federalism rather than ethnic federalism."

He warns that "a Bosnia solution would end up with Iraq as a two-state entity: one Arab and one Kurdish. We support a federal system based on Iraq's current 18 provinces where each would have power akin to the German laender."

To succeed, a central Iraqi government would eventually have to control and redistribute the nation's oil proceeds under a revenue-sharing scheme that would give all groups and regions a powerful economic interest to remain in a united Iraq.

Ultimately, of course, whether Iraq's disparate ethnic groups and religious sects forge a common future lies in the hearts of ordinary Iraqis. The absence of widespread acts of revenge by Shiites following the assassination of their beloved Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim (presumably by former Sunni Baathists loyal to Hussein) gives cautious hope that cooler heads and the spirit of compromise will prevail.

In which case, Iraqis will be able to join Clemenceau in expressing their apologies to Attila.