When Military Ties Save Lives;
After the Tsunami
by Stanley A. Weiss

PHUKET, Thailand -- The devastation of the Indian Ocean tsunami was answered with a massive global outpouring of charity and the largest humanitarian effort in history. Yet not all the relief efforts across the region were created equal, and a tale of two countries reveals that the attitude of local militaries made a crucial difference.

Here in Thailand, within hours of the disaster, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra accepted an offer of assistance from the United States. Within days, the Americans set up a regional command center at the air base in Utapao, where military teams from nine nations have managed the largest military operation in Asia since the Vietnam War.

Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Robert Blackman, who coordinates U.S efforts at Utapao, says, "without this capability here I don't think that we would be anywhere near as successful as we have been today."

Across the Straits of Malacca in the devastated Indonesian province of Aceh, cooperation has not been as smooth. Indonesia's president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a retired general, has publicly thanked foreign troops and relief groups. But elements within the Indonesian armed forces haven't been as welcoming.

In the first days of the disaster, foreign aircraft bearing emergency aid were denied landing rights, and some aid groups were turned away. Relief workers have had to obtain special permission and military escorts when traveling war-torn Aceh. The arrival of U.S. troops in the coastal city of Meulaboh was delayed when Indonesians feared the sight of marines coming ashore would smack of an invasion.

Soon after Vice President Jusuf Kalla said that foreign troops should leave the country within three months, "the sooner the better," Jakarta yielded to international protests and conceded that late March was only a "target" for Indonesia to assume more responsibility for relief and reconstruction.

Why the reluctance to embrace the Americans?

As the country with the largest Muslim population in the world, religious sensitivities -- and Washington's war on terror, seen by many as a war on Islam -- are surely factors. The very idea of American forces on Indonesian soil was unthinkable before the tsunami.

But the lack of closer military-to-military ties may explain why some in the Indonesian armed forces remain wary of the United States. Since Washington suspended International Military Education Training with Jakarta over military abuses in East Timor in 1991, an entire generation of Indonesian military leaders has had little or no contact with America.

Only after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, did Washington resume some counterterrorism training and joint military exercises with Indonesia. And only after the tsunami were U.S. restrictions eased on the sale of military equipment so Indonesia could repair its crippled C-130 cargo planes and ferry aid to Aceh.

In contrast, the United States and Thailand have had deep military ties for decades. Utapao was a key base for American B-52 bombers during the Vietnam War. Every year, U.S. and Thai forces lead Cobra Cold, a huge multinational training exercise focused on peacekeeping and disaster relief. These relationships paid off during disaster relief efforts.

U.S. Ambassador to Thailand Ralph Boyce tells me that the relief effort here has benefited greatly from "50 years of strong relations" between the two militaries. U.S. Pacific commander Admiral Thomas Fargo told reporters, "This isn't something that just comes together at a moments' notice." It's "because we made an investment in these relationships . . . over many years."

Likewise in India, whose navy has held exercises with the Americans in recent years, joint search and rescue missions off Sri Lanka were described as "seamless," according to Joint Secretary for the Americas S. Jaishankar. The U.S. ambassador, David Mulford, says that because military ties build mutual trust, it took only a few phone calls after the tsunami and "both countries opened up, no secrets."

Alas, the self-righteousness of those in Congress who oppose military education and training programs that help build modern, professional militaries that respect civilian control and human rights!

Who pays the price for denying soldiers access to such training and ties with the United States? In this case, desperate tsunami victims who depend on their militaries to deliver life-saving food and medicine. As U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said in Jakarta this month, "cutting off contact with Indonesian officers only makes the problem worse."

Yudhoyono, who himself received military training in the United States, may be the man to break the impasse. When I spoke with him last year, he stressed the importance of resuming military-to-military ties. Elected in a landslide last fall, Yudhoyono has the clout to implement his reformist agenda. The United States, by increasing its influence with rank-and-file soldiers through renewed ties, can help him build a modern, professional military.

Given political, cultural and religious sensitivities in Asia, Washington is rightly avoiding using military aid during the tsunami tragedy as a Trojan horse for an expanded military presence in the region. But an early lesson of this post-tsunami world is that the military ties often scorned by critics can -- and do -- save lives in times of peace as well as war.