A Farewell to Iraqi Arms?
What Iraq's Militias Can Learn from Other Civil Wars
by Stanley A. Weiss

LONDON - Amid the carnage and chaos of Iraq, a well-armed militia is the closest thing any ethnic, religious or tribal group thinks it can have to an insurance policy for its own survival. But as each bombing and assassination pushes Iraq deeper into all-out sectarian war, Iraqis are learning an old lesson of multi-ethnic societies - private armies organized in the name of self-preservation only risk insuring their own destruction.

For Iraq's Sunni minority, the insurgency remains their bar-gaining chip for regaining a slice of the power they enjoyed under Saddam Hussein. But each new attack only risks a Shiite-Sunni civil war - one that vastly outnumbered Sunnis would surely lose.

Among the Shiite religious parties, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq wields the paramilitary Badr Brigade, armed by Tehran's Revolutionary Guards. But a campaign of assassination and torture against Sunnis - reportedly by the Badr-controlled Interior Ministry - only hardens Sunni resolve to resist Shiite rule.

By repeatedly unleashing his Mahdi Army against coalition forces, the young firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has become Iraqi's leading hardline Shiite nationalist. But by clashing with rival Badr forces and forging tactical alliances with Sunnis, Sadr has added to his list of mortal enemies.

Finally, the Kurds of northern Iraq, with their 100,000 peshmerga fighters, may finally fulfill their dream of independence. But reports of peshmerga terrorizing Arabs and Turkmen in multi-ethnic cities like Mosul and Kirkuk risks intervention by Turkish or international forces.

Though comforting to their brethren, these private armies deprive Baghdad of a basic tenet of any sovereign state - a monopoly on the use of coercive force. So how can Iraq avoid the fate of countries like Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and even Pakistan, where powerful militias, rebels and warlords function as states-within-a-state? Or Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Muslims, Croats and Serbs still hunker down behind their own armies?

A survey of insurgencies and civil wars around the world shows that armed groups can be demobilized, disarmed and reintegrated into civilian life - provided the new insurance they're offered is better than the old militia they have.

No compromise, no peace. Successful demobilizations start with a broader political settlement that addresses core grievances. In the tsunami-ravaged Indonesian province of Aceh, rebels have given up their fight for independence in exchange for greater autonomy and a larger share of oil and gas revenues. In Macedonia, ethnic Albanian rebels laid down their arms after being promised new protections for their culture and language.

The lesson for Iraq: Sunnis are unlikely to be pacified until the country's de-Baathification policy is eased to afford them a greater political voice and until the constitution is amended to give Sunnis a more equitable distribution of oil revenues.

Reconciliation, not retribution. From El Salvador to Sierra Leone, war-torn countries have often forged a more peaceful future by pardoning the past. In Colombia, more than 10,000 right-wing paramilitaries have disarmed under the promise of full or partial amnesty. Iraqis should embrace the proposal of outgoing president Jalal Talabani - general amnesty for insurgents, except for foreign jihadists like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

Farewell to arms. There are several ways that Baghdad could gain better command and control of militias and disarm rebel groups. For Shiites and Kurds in the new Iraqi army who remain loyal to their Shiite and Kurdish masters, Baghdad should consider Afghanistan's New Beginnings program, which seeks to break the chain of command between soldiers and warlords through retraining and a stronger defense ministry.

For the Kurdish peshmerga, an unlikely model is Kosovo, where the ethnic Albanian rebels of the Kosovo Liberation Army have been converted into a lightly-armed civil defense corps under NATO supervision but which Kosovars see as the future army of an independent state. Although the peshmerga will surely resist disarming, even temporarily, such a defense corps could make Kurdish independence more palatable to Turkey, Iran and Syria, each with their own restive Kurds.

For the Sunni insurgency and Sadr's Mahdi Army, a money-for-guns program could offer each fighter a cash incentive for disarming. To avoid repeating the mistakes of Nicaragua and Liberia, where fighters turned disarmament into a business that fueled more violence, Baghdad might replicate another initiative in Afghanistan that offers public works projects to communities where militias give up their guns.

To rebuild trust among Iraqis, gunmen would surrender weapons under foreign monitors, similar to the commission that last year verified the disarming of the Irish Republican Army. For militias that did not disarm voluntarily, government forces should do so forcibly, as the army of the Democratic Republic of Congo is now doing with help from United Nation forces.

Ultimately, the successful demobilization of Iraqi militias will depend on their reintegration into society. As part of the peace accord that ended 11 years of civil war, Sierra Leone provided more than 75,000 former fighters vocational training or tuition-free education. When U.N. peacekeepers left this month after a six-year mission, the rehabilitation of rebels was credited with sustaining peace in the war-ravaged country.

Sooner or later, Iraqis will realize that their militias don't provide the insurance they advertise. If later, Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds alike will pay a heavy price in a catastrophic sectarian war. If sooner, all Iraqis could find even greater security in the many models for turning soldiers back into civilians.

Disarming sooner also has its risks. But, in the end, it is the only premium worth paying.